

Electron Security

Making your Mac a worse place?

Mykola Grymalyuk - June 21st, 2024
MacDevOpsYVR 2023

\$ '/usr/bin/whoami'

> "Mykola Grymalyuk"

- Security and Development Technician at RIVEDA Consulting.
- Project lead of OpenCore Legacy Patcher.
- Breaks macOS internals on my blog, khronokernel.com.



What is Electron?

What is Electron?

What is Electron?

1. Chromium




What is Electron?

1. Chromium



2. Node.JS




What is Electron?

1. Chromium



2. Node.JS




3. Multi-Platform



Electron


- Initial release in 2013.
- Designed originally for Atom.
- Other frameworks also exist, like nwjs (formerly node-webkit)
- Many applications use Electron:
 - Slack
 - Discord
 - Visual Studio Code
 - 1Password
 - OpenVPN



Electron Structure

Electron Structure


Electron Structure




Entry Point

`Vendor.app/Contents/MacOS/Vendor`

Electron Structure



Entry Point




Electron Framework

`Vendor.app/Contents/MacOS/Vendor`


`./Contents/Frameworks/Electron Framework.framework`

Electron Structure





Entry Point

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Electron Framework


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ASAR


`./Contents/Resources/app.asar`

Electron Structure




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Electron Framework

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


ASAR

`./Contents/Resources/app.asar`




Electron Structure





Entry Point

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Electron Framework

`./Contents/Frameworks/Electron Framework.framework`



ASAR

`./Contents/Resources/app.asar`



Electron Fuses

Electron Fuses

Debug options!

- Embedded inside Electron.framework.
- Introduced with Electron v12.0.0 in 2021.
- Found after a “`sentinel`”:
 - `dL7pKGdnNz796PbbjQWNKmHXBZaB9tsX`
- 8 fuses currently implemented as of fuses v1.8.0.
- On/Off switches.
 - Similar to macOS’ System Integrity Protection (SIP)

```
5  /**
6   * Maps config keys to their index in the fuse wire
7   */
8  export enum FuseV10options {
9      RunAsNode = 0,
10     EnableCookieEncryption = 1,
11     EnableNodeOptionsEnvironmentVariable = 2,
12     EnableNodeCliInspectArguments = 3,
13     EnableEmbeddedAsarIntegrityValidation = 4,
14     OnlyLoadAppFromAsar = 5,
15     LoadBrowserProcessSpecificV8Snapshot = 6,
16     GrantFileProtocolExtraPrivileges = 7,
17 }
18
```




Labels Proc. Str ☆ ●

Q Search

> Tag Scope

- DecoderSelector::SelectDec...
- %u.%u.%u.%u
- 0123456789
- 0123456789abcdef
- 0123456789ABCDEF
- PATH=
- __ELECTRON_NATIVE_WINDOW__
- electron.devtools.bounds
- electron.devtools.zoom
- electron.devtools.preferen...
- partition.default_zoom_lev...
- partition.per_host_zoom_le...
- .asar
- browser
- ELECTRON_RUN_AS_NODE
- TrackedObjectKey
- frame
- width
- height
- width

187575 strings

73655ec	AA AA
7365606	AA AA
7365620	AA AA
736563a	AA AA
7365654	AA AA AA AA 68 74 74 70 73 00 64 4C 37 70 4B 47 64 6E 4E 7A 37 39 36 50 62 62https://dL7pKGdnNz796Pbb
736566e	5A 51 57 4E 4B 6D 48 58 42 5A 61 42 39 74 73 58 01 08 30 31 30 30 31 31 30 30	jQwNKmHXBZaB9tsX..01001100
7365688	00 00 00 00 7B 93 C2 65 01 00 00 00 7B 93 C2 65 D2 08 A3 05 00 00 00 00 DD 00	...{.e...{.e.....
73656a2	00 00 DD 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 7B 93 C2 65 01 00 00 00 7B 93 C2 65	...{.e...{.e.....
73656bc	D2 08 A3 05 00 00 00 DD 00 00 00 DD 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 20 2E 2E 2E 20 28 (
73656d6	6D 65 73 73 61 67 65 20 74 72 75 6E 63 61 74 65 64 29 0A 00 40 40 40 40 40 40	message truncated)..@@@@
73656f0	40 40 40 68 48 48 48 48 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40	@@hHHH@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@
736570a	28 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 84 84 84 84 84 84 84 84 84	(.....
7365724	10 10 10 10 10 10 10 85 85 85 85 85 85 05 05 05 05 05 05 05 05 05 05 05 05
736573e	05 05 05 05 05 05 05 10 10 10 10 10 10 85 85 85 85 85 85 05 05 05 05 05 05
7365758	05 05 05 05 05 05 05 05 05 05 05 05 10 10 10 10 40 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00@.....
7365772	00 00
736578c	00 00
73657a6	00 00
73657c0	00 00
73657da	00 00
73657f4	0A 0B 0C 0D 0E 0F 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 1A 1B 1C 1D 1E 1F 20 21 22 23 !"#
736580e	24 25 26 27 28 29 2A 2B 2C 2D 2E 2F 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 3A 3B 3C 3D	.\$%&'()*+,-./0123456789:;<=
7365828	3E 3F 40 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 6A 6B 6C 6D 6E 6F 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77	>?@abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvw
7365842	78 79 7A 5B 5C 5D 5E 5F 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 6A 6B 6C 6D 6E 6F 70 71	xyz[\]^_`abcdefghijklmnopq
736585c	72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 7A 7B 7C 7D 7E 7F 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 8A 8B	rstuvwxyz{ }~.....
7365876	8C 8D 8E 8F 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 9A 9B 9C 9D 9E 9F A0 A1 A2 A3 A4 A5
7365890	A6 A7 A8 A9 AA AB AC AD AE AF B0 B1 B2 B3 B4 B5 B6 B7 B8 B9 BA BB BC BD BE BF
73658aa	C0 C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 C7 C8 C9 CA CB CC CD CE CF D0 D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 D6 D7 D8 D9
73658c4	DA DB DC DD DE DF E0 E1 E2 E3 E4 E5 E6 E7 E8 E9 EA EB EC ED EE EF F0 F1 F2 F3


```
AA AA AA AA AA AA AA AA .....
AA AA AA AA AA AA AA AA .....
AA AA AA AA AA AA AA AA .....
AA AA AA AA AA AA AA AA .....
E 7A 37 39 36 50 62 62 .....https.dL7pKGdnNz796Pbb
30 31 30 30 31 31 30 30 jQwNKmHXBZaB9tsX..01001100
A3 05 00 00 00 00 DD 00 .....{.e...{.e.....
01 00 00 00 7B 93 C2 65 .....{.e...{.e
00 00 20 2E 2E 2E 20 28 ..... (
0A 00 40 40 40 40 40 40 message truncated)..@@@@@
40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 @@@hHHH@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@
84 84 84 84 84 84 84 84 (.....
05 05 05 05 05 05 05 05 .....
85 05 05 05 05 05 05 05 .....
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 .....@.....
```

```
AA AA AA AA AA AA AA AA .....
AA AA AA AA AA AA AA AA .....
AA AA AA AA AA AA AA AA .....
AA AA AA AA AA AA AA AA .....
E 7A 37 39 36 50 62 62 .....https.dL7pKGdnNz796Pbb
30 31 30 30 31 31 30 30 jQwNKmHXBZaB9tsX..01001100
A3 05 00 00 00 00 DD 00 .....{..e...{..e.....
01 00 00 00 7B 93 C2 65 .....{..e...{..e
00 00 20 2E 2E 2E 20 28 ..... (
0A 00 40 40 40 40 40 40 message truncated)..@@@@@
40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 @@@hHHH@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@
84 84 84 84 84 84 84 84 (.....
05 05 05 05 05 05 05 05 .....
85 05 05 05 05 05 05 05 .....
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 .....@.....
```



Slack's Electron Fuses

- 0 → 0x0 RunAsNode
- 1 → 0x1 EnableCookieEncryption
- 0 → 0x2 EnableNodeOptionsEnvironmentVariable
- 0 → 0x3 EnableNodeCliInspectArguments
- 1 → 0x4 EnableEmbeddedAsarIntegrityValidation
- 1 → 0x5 OnlyLoadAppFromAsar
- 0 → 0x6 LoadBrowserProcessSpecificV8Snapshot
- 0 → 0x7 GrantFileProtocolExtraPrivileges

Apple's System Integrity Protection

0x803 -> 1000 0000 0011 -> 1100 0000 0001


1	→	0x1	CSR_ALLOW_UNTRUSTED_KEXTS
1	→	0x2	CSR_ALLOW_UNRESTRICTED_FS
0	→	0x4	CSR_ALLOW_TASK_FOR_PID
0	→	0x8	CSR_ALLOW_KERNEL_DEBUGGER
0	→	0x10	CSR_ALLOW_APPLE_INTERNAL
0	→	0x20	CSR_ALLOW_UNRESTRICTED_DTRACE
0	→	0x40	CSR_ALLOW_UNRESTRICTED_NVRAM
0	→	0x80	CSR_ALLOW_DEVICE_CONFIGURATION
0	→	0x100	CSR_ALLOW_ANY_RECOVERY_OS
0	→	0x200	CSR_ALLOW_UNAPPROVED_KEXTS
0	→	0x400	CSR_ALLOW_EXECUTABLE_POLICY_OVERRIDE
1	→	0x800	CSR_ALLOW_UNAUTHENTICATED_ROOT

The fun electron fuses




RunAsNode

- Introduced in Electron v0.35.2
- Environment Variable:
 - `RUN_AS_NODE`
- Free node.js shell.




EnableNodeCliInspectArguments

- Introduced with Electron v2.0.0
- Argument:
 - `--inspect={port}`
- WebSocket for communication.



RunAsNode

```
$ RUN_AS_NODE=1 Vendor.app/Contents/MacOS/Vendor hello.js
```



EnableNodeCliInspectArguments



```
$ Vendor.app/Contents/MacOS/Vendor --inspect=4096
> http://127.0.0.1:4096/json/ -> websocketDebuggerUrl
> ws://127.0.0.1:26711/e580f9b3-0905-4c49-8a37-e3d17ea04410:
{"params": {
  "expression": "eval('hello world')"}
}
```

What does this mean for us?

Arbitrary code execution 🎉


Arbitrary Code Execution

- Ability to run random code of your choosing.
- Code Signature Inheritance.
 - Launch Service Prompts.
 - TCC Inheritance.



TCC

- Transparency, Consent, and Control.
- Yeah those annoying prompts.
- Inheritance for child processes.
- Important to Apple.




Attack Scenario #1 in Enterprise

Malicious software in Enterprise



Malicious software in Enterprise



Malicious software in Enterprise




Attack Scenario #2 in Enterprise

Malicious user in Enterprise



Malicious user in Enterprise



Malicious user in Enterprise



Malicious user in Enterprise




```
com.apple.TCC.configuration-profile-policy
├── Services
│   └── ScreenCapture
│       └── AllowStandardUserToSetSystemService
```

So how do you find misconfigured apps?

Python to the rescue 🐍

Lectricus


- Python-based library for finding vulnerable electron apps.
- Multi-platform.
- Available as standalone CLI or GUI.
 - No dependancy hell.
- Supports PLIST, XML, JSON and CSV exports.
- Open source on GitHub.



macOS Demo



macOS Demo



What's Electron's response to this?

Statement regarding "runAsNode" CVEs

Posted February 7th, 2024

- In response to CVEs filed in bad faith.
- Is a valid vulnerability.
- Chrome Security Model.
- No TCC bypasses mentioned.

Latest posts

Electron 30.0.0

Google Summer of Code 2024

Electron 29.0.0

Introducing electron/rfcs

[Statement regarding "runAsNode" CVEs](#)

Electron 28.0.0

Ecosystem 2023 Recap

December Quiet Month (Dec'23)

Electron 27.0.0

Breach to Barrier: Strengthening Apps with the Sandbox

Electron 26.0.0

Electron 25.0.0

Electron 24.0.0

10 years of Electron 🎉

Electron 23.0.0

Electron 22.0.0

Farewell, Windows 7/8/8.1

A Quiet Place Part II (Dec'22)

Introducing Electron Forge 6

Maintainer Summit 2022 Recap

Electron 21.0.0

Electron 20.0.0

Electron and the V8 Memory Cage

Electron 19.0.0

S3 Bucket Migration


Electron 18.0.0

Google Summer of Code 2022

Electron 17.0.0

Statement regarding "runAsNode" CVEs

February 7, 2024 · 4 min read



VerteDinde



felixrieseberg

Earlier today, the Electron team was alerted to several public CVEs recently filed against several notable Electron apps. The CVEs are related to two of Electron's **fuses** - `runAsNode` and `enableNodeCliInspectArguments` - and incorrectly claim that a remote attacker is able to execute arbitrary code via these components if they have not been actively disabled.

We do not believe that these CVEs were filed in good faith. First of all, the statement is incorrect - the configuration does *not* enable remote code execution. Secondly, companies called out in these CVEs have not been notified despite having bug bounty programs. Lastly, while we do believe that disabling the components in question enhances app security, we do not believe that the CVEs have been filed with the correct severity. "Critical" is reserved for issues of the highest danger, which is certainly not the case here.

Anyone is able to request a CVE. While this is good for the overall health of the software industry, "farming CVEs" to bolster the reputation of a single security researcher is not helpful.

That said, we understand that the mere existence of a CVE with the scary **critical** severity might lead to end user confusion, so as a project, we'd like to offer guidance and assistance in dealing with the issue.

How might this impact me?

After reviewing the CVEs, the Electron team believes that these CVEs are not critical.


An attacker needs to already be able to execute arbitrary commands on the

What's the end goal with Lectricus?

What's the end goal with Lectricus?




Educate



Take action

Ways to take action

- Developers:
 - Review fuses in your electron Apps.
 - Not just the two talked about, many more dangerous fuses.
- Users:
 - Find and report misconfigured fuses in app you use.
- Admins:
 - Same as users.
 - Remove TCC permissions from apps that are vulnerable.
 - `$ sudo tccutil reset All com.bad.app`



Thanks for listening to my rambles!

Mirrored on kronokernel.com

Links and shoutouts!

- Lectricus:
 - <https://github.com/ripeda/lectricus>
- TsunekOh's CVE-2023-32546:
 - What kicked off this idea for Electron querying!
 - Chatwork Desktop Application.
 - Part of their SIP bypass talk at CODE BLUE 2023.
- Wojciech Reguła's electroniz3r:
 - Didn't know it existed when I started Lectricus...
 - But made me go further with Lectricus!
 - <https://github.com/r3ggi/electroniz3r>
- Electron:
 - <https://www.electronjs.org/docs/latest/tutorial/fuses>
 - <https://www.electronjs.org/blog/statement-run-as-node-cves>

